Abstract
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 2 |
| Pages (from-to) | 25-32 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Rivista di Filosofia del diritto |
| Volume | 1 |
| State | Accepted/In press - 1 Jun 2026 |
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In: Rivista di Filosofia del diritto, Vol. 1, 2, 01.06.2026, p. 25-32.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - The “Hard Cases-Easy Cases” Relationship through the Lens of Three Thesis of F. Waismann, W.V.O. Quine, and L. Wittgenstein
AU - Zezza Schiavi, Michele Beniamino
AU - Szczaranski Vargas, Federico Leon
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PY - 2026/6/1
Y1 - 2026/6/1
N2 - This study examines the distinction between easy and hard cases in legal reasoning, drawing on Waismann’s open texture, Quine’s critique of analyticity, and Wittgenstein’s practice-based view of meaning. These perspectives challenge the idea that legal norms have fixed semantic boundaries and instead show how legal systems achieve stable patterns of application through shifting linguistic practices, interpretive routines, and evolving background knowledge. The central thesis is that the ease or difficulty of a case arises not from the legal text itself, but from how concepts are socially entrenched and adapted. By illustrating how paradigmatic cases emerge and how changes in social, technological, or doctrinal contexts can transform easy cases into hard ones, the study offers a practice-dependent account of legal determinacy, emphasizing the role of linguistic, pragmatic, and institutional factors in shaping the continuum between easy and hard cases.
AB - This study examines the distinction between easy and hard cases in legal reasoning, drawing on Waismann’s open texture, Quine’s critique of analyticity, and Wittgenstein’s practice-based view of meaning. These perspectives challenge the idea that legal norms have fixed semantic boundaries and instead show how legal systems achieve stable patterns of application through shifting linguistic practices, interpretive routines, and evolving background knowledge. The central thesis is that the ease or difficulty of a case arises not from the legal text itself, but from how concepts are socially entrenched and adapted. By illustrating how paradigmatic cases emerge and how changes in social, technological, or doctrinal contexts can transform easy cases into hard ones, the study offers a practice-dependent account of legal determinacy, emphasizing the role of linguistic, pragmatic, and institutional factors in shaping the continuum between easy and hard cases.
KW - “Analytic–synthetic” dichotomy
KW - family resemblances
KW - open texture
M3 - Article
SN - 2280-482X
VL - 1
SP - 25
EP - 32
JO - Rivista di Filosofia del diritto
JF - Rivista di Filosofia del diritto
M1 - 2
ER -