On the Relationship Between Positive and Negative Rights: The Overdetermination of Social Rights as a Challenge to the Thesis of Their Gradual and Quantitative Distinction

This paper critically examines the relationship between negative and positive rights, focusing on the conceptual and practical challenges posed by the traditional distinction be-tween them. The proposed hypothesis asserts that traditional distinctions fail to capture the evolving nature of rights in practice, particularly in constitutional democracies. The paper advocates for a more nuanced framework that accommodates the complexity of rights, emphasizing their functional hybridity and the necessity for judicial flexibility in interpreting them.
Methodologically, the paper combines historical analysis, theoretical perspectives, and jurisprudential case studies to argue for a more dynamic understanding of rights, one that reflects both structural and contingent factors in their application. It posits that rights cannot be fully understood without acknowledging their interdependence across the socio-economic, political, and legal spheres.
The central aim is to explore how social rights serve as a space where positive and negative obligations intertwine, ultimately challenging the rigid dichotomy between these categories. It proposes that rights should be understood along a relational spectrum, reflecting their interdependence rather than a fixed distinction.