On the Precariousness of the Demarcation Line in Certain Theoretical-Legal Distinctions: Some Considerations in Light of Quine’s Critique of the “Analytic–Synthetic” Dichotomy

This article examines the conceptual fragility of several foundational distinctions in legal theory—such as interpretation in abstracto vs. in concreto, expressed vs. unexpressed norms, and interpretation vs. integration/construction—critically assessing their coherence through the lens of W.V.O. Quine’s semantic holism. Without presuming the full applicability of Quine’s approach to legal reasoning, the analysis explores the possibility and limits of analogically transposing some of the author’s key theses—particularly his critique of the “analytic–synthetic” distinction and his holistic conception of meaning—into the legal domain. The working hypothesis is that, although not prescriptive, these theoretical tools can help reconstruct the internal logic of interpretative practices by exposing their underlying conceptual and epistemic assumptions.