Anti-conflictualist and liberal minimalism of rights: An analysis from the perspective of interest theory and the dynamic approach

The article describes two different miimalist approaches in the field of recognition and protection of rights: The anti-conflictual and the liberal variants. It explores their historical-cultural assumptions and highlights their main elements of their unreasonableness. Methodology: To this end, we use some theoretical tools deriving from the combination of contemporary interest theory with a dynamic approach. Aim: One of the most relevant purposes of the research is to demonstrate the theoretical non-sustainability of those reconstructions which attributes to the historical succession of the different categories of rights a clear structural distinction between negative rights, understood as "self-executing", and positive rights to public provisions. Achievement: The combination of these frameworks (dynamic theory and interest theory) provides a valid conceptual basis for the recognition of social rights in a parity plan regarding traditional rights of freedom; on the other hand, this position leads directly to the rejection of minimalism: Classical civil liberties, just as the material conditions necessary for a dignified living, make up protected goods or interests of the subjects who demand positive benefits to be guaranteed. Contributions: The work provides a philosophical research on the theoretical foundations of social rights in relation to the classical liberal rights of the first generation acquires a special relevance within the project. The present study looks forward to contributing to the unsustainability of those reconstructions that attribute to the historical succession of the different categories of rights a clear structural distinction between negative rights, understood as "self-executing", and positive rights to public benefits of the State.